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BRIEF STUDIES IN REALISM. I

Naïve Realism vs. Presentative Realism[1]

I

IN spite of the elucidations of contemporary realists, a number of idealists continue to adduce in behalf of idealism certain facts having an obvious physical nature and explanation. The visible convergence of the railway tracks, for example, is cited as evidence that what is seen is a mental "content." Yet this convergence follows from the physical properties of light and a lens, and is physically demonstrated in a camera. Is the photograph, then, to be conceived as a psychical somewhat? That the time of the visibility of a light does not coincide with the time at which a distant body emitted the light is employed to support the same sort of conclusion, in spite of the fact that the exact difference in time may be deduced from a physical property of light—its rate. The dislocation in space of the light seen and the astronomical star is used as evidence of the mental nature of the former, though the exact angular difference is a matter of simple computation from purely physical data. The doubling of images of, say, the finger when the eyeball is pressed is frequently treated as a clincher. Yet it is a simple matter to take any body that reflects light, and by a suitable arrangement of lenses produce not only two but many images, projected into space. If the fact that under definite *physical* conditions (misplacement of lenses), a finger yields two images proves the psychical character of the latter, then the fact that under certain conditions a sounding body

[1] I am indebted to Dr. Bush's article on "Knowledge and Perception," this JOURNAL, Vol. VI., p. 393, and to Professor Woodbridge's article on "Perception and Epistemology" in the "James Memorial Volume," as well as to his paper on "Sensations," read at the 1910 meeting of the American Philosophical Association. Since my point of departure and aim are somewhat different, I make this general acknowledgment in lieu of more specific references.

yields one or more echoes is, by parity of reasoning, proof that the echo is made of mental stuff.[2]

If, once more, the difference in form and color of a table to different observers, occupying different physical positions, is proof that what each sees is a psychical, private, isolated somewhat, then the fact that one and the same physical body has different effects upon, or relations with, different physical media is proof of the mental nature of these effects. Take a lump of wax, and subject it to the same heat, located at different positions; now the wax is solid, now liquid—it might even be gaseous. How "psychical" these phenomena! It almost seems as if the transformation of the physical into the mental in the cases cited exemplified an interesting psychological phenomenon. In each case the beginning is with a real and physical existence. Taking "the real object," the astronomical star, on the basis of its physical reality, the idealist concludes to a psychical object, radically different! Taking the *single* object, the finger, from the premise of its real singleness he concludes to a double mental content, which then takes the place of the original single thing! Taking one-and-the-same-object, the table, presenting *its* different surfaces and reflections of light to different real organisms, he eliminates the one-table-in-its-different-relations in behalf of a multiplicity of totally separate psychical tables! The logic reminds us of the story of the countryman who, after gazing at the giraffe, remarked, "There ain't no such animal." It almost seems, I repeat, as if this self-contradiction in the argument created in some minds the impression that the object—not the argument—was undergoing the extraordinary reversal of form.

However this may be, the problem indicated in the above cases is simply the good old problem of the many in one, or, less cryptically, the problem of the maintenance of a continuity of process throughout differences. I do not pretend that this situation, though the most familiar thing in life, is wholly without difficulties. But its difficulty is not one of epistemology, that is, of the relation of known to a knower; to take it as such, and then to use it as proof of the psychical nature of a final term, is also to prove that the trail the rocket stick leaves behind is psychical, or that the flower which comes in a continuity of process from a seed is mental.

[2] Plato's use of shadows, of reflections in the water, and other "images" or "imitations" to prove the presence in nature of non-being was, considering the state of physical science in his day, a much more sensible conclusion than the modern use of certain images as proof that the object in perception is a psychical content.

II

Contemporary realists have so frequently and clearly expounded the physical explanation of such cases as have been cited that one is at a loss as to why idealists go on repeating the cases without even alluding to the realistic explanation. One is moved to wonder whether this neglect is just one of those circumstances which persistently dog philosophical discussions, or whether something in the realistic position gives ground (from at least an *ad hominem* point of view) for the neglect. There is a reason for adopting the latter alternative. Many realists, in offering the type of explanation adduced above, have treated the cases of seen light, doubled imagery, as perception in a way that ascribes to perception an inherent cognitive status. They have treated the perceptions as *cases of knowledge,* instead of as simply natural events having, in themselves (apart from a *use* that may be made of them), no more knowledge status or worth than, say, a shower or a fever. What I intend to show is that if "perceptions" are regarded as cases of knowledge, the gate is opened to the idealistic interpretation. The physical explanation holds of them as long as they are regarded simply as natural events—a doctrine I shall call naïve realism; it does not hold of them considered as cases of knowledge—the view I call presentative realism.

The idealists attribute to the realists the doctrine that "the perceived object is the real object." Please note the wording; it assumes that there is *the* real object, something which stands in a contrasting relation with objects not real or else less real. Since it is easily demonstrable that there is a numerical duplicity between the astronomical star and the visible light, between the single finger and the doubled images, when the former is dubbed "*the*" real object the latter evidently stands in disparaging contrast to its reality. *If* it is a case of knowledge, the knowledge refers to the star; and yet not the star, but something more or less unreal (that is, if the star be "the" real object), is known.

Consider how simply the matter stands in what I have called naïve realism. The astronomical star is *a* real object, but not "the" real object; the visible light is another real object, found, when knowledge supervenes, to be an occurrence standing in a process continuous with the star. Since the seen light is an event within a continuous process, there is no point of view from which its "reality" contrasts with that of the star.

But suppose that the realist accepts the traditionary psychology according to which every event in the way of a perception is also a case of knowing something. Is the way out now so simple? In the case of the doubled fingers or the seen light, the thing known in

perception contrasts with the physical source and cause of the knowledge. There *is* a numerical duplicity. Moreover the thing known in perception is in relation to a knower, while the physical cause is not as such in relation to a knower. Is not the most plausible account of the difference between the physical cause of the perceptive knowledge and what the latter presents precisely this latter difference—namely, presentation to a knower? If perception is a case of knowing, it must be a case of knowing the star; but since the "real" star is not known in the perception, the knowledge relation must somehow have changed the "object" into a "content." Thus when the realist conceives the perceptual occurrence as a case of knowledge or of presentation to a mind or knower, he lets the nose of the idealist camel into the tent. He has then no great cause for surprise when the camel comes in—and devours the tent.

Perhaps it will seem as if in this last paragraph I had gone back on what I said earlier regarding the physical explanation of the difference between the visible light and the astronomical star. On the contrary, my point is that this explanation, though wholly adequate as long as we conceive the perception to be itself simply a natural event, is not at all available when we conceive it to be a case of knowledge. In the former case, we are dealing with a relation between natural events. In the latter case, we are dealing with the difference between an object as a cause of knowledge and an object as known, and hence in relation to mind. By the "method of difference" the sole explanation of the difference between the two objects is the absence or presence of relation to mind.

In the case of the seen light,[3] reference to the velocity of light is quite adequate to account for its occurrence in its time and space difference from the star. But viewed as a case of what is known (on the supposition that perception is a case of knowledge), reference to it only increases the contrast between the real object and the object known in perception. For, being just as much a part of the object that causes the perception as is the star itself, it (the velocity of light) *ought* to be part of what is known in the percep-

[3] It is impossible, in this brief paper, to forestall every misapprehension and objection. Yet to many the use of the term "seen" will appear to be an admission that a case of knowledge is involved. But is smelling a case of knowledge? Or (if the superstition persists as to smell) is gnawing or poking a case of knowledge? My point, of course, is that "seen" involves a relation to organic activity, not to a knower, or mind. Furthermore, the seen light is not in relation *to* an organism. We may speak, if we will or if we must, of the relation of vibrations of the ether to the eye-function; but we can not speak, without making nonsense, of the relation of the perceptual light to an eye, or an eye-activity. For the joint efficiencies of the eye-activity and of the vibrations condition the seen light.

tion, while it is not. Since the velocity of light is a constituent element in the star, it should be known in the perception; since it is not so known, reference to it only increases the discrepancy between the object of the perception—the seen light—and the real, astronomical star. The same is true of any physical conditions that might be referred to: *The very things that, from the standpoint of perception as a natural event, are conditions that account for its happening are, from the standpoint of perception as a case of knowledge, part of the object that ought to be known but is not.*

In this fact we have, perhaps, the ground of the idealist's disregard of the oft-proffered physical explanation of the difference between the perceptual event and *the* (so-called) real object. And it is quite possible that some realists who read these lines will feel that in my last paragraphs I have been making a covert argument for idealism. Not so, I repeat; they are an argument for a truly naïve realism. The presentative realist, in his appeal to "common sense" and the "plain man," first sophisticates the umpire and then appeals. He stops a good way short of a genuine naïveté. The plain man, for a surety, does not regard noises heard, lights seen, etc., as mental existences; but neither does he regard them as things *known*. That they are just things is good enough for him. That they are in relation to mind, or in relation to mind as their "knower," no more occurs to him than that they are mental. By this I mean much more than that the formulæ of epistemology are foreign to him; I mean that his attitude to these things *as* things involves their *not* being in relation to mind or a knower. Once depart from this thorough naïveté, and substitute for it the psychological theory that perception is a cognitive presentation of an object to a mind, and the first step is taken on the road which ends in an idealistic system.

III

For simplicity's sake, I have written as if my main problem were to show how, in the face of a supposed difficulty, a strictly realistic theory of the perceptual event may be maintained. But my interest is primarily in the facts, and in the theory only because of the facts it formulates. The significance of the facts of the case may, perhaps, be indicated by a consideration which has thus far been ignored. In regarding a perception as a case of knowledge, the presentative realist does more than shove into it a relation to mind which then, naturally and inevitably, becomes the explanation of any differences that exist between its subject-matter and the constitution of some real object with which it contrasts. In many cases—very important cases, too, in the physical sciences—the contrasting "real object" does not become "known" by perception or presentation. It is

known by a logical process, by inference—as the case of the contemporary position of the star is determined by calculations from data, not by perception. This, then, is the situation of the presentative realist: If perception is a case or mode of knowledge, it stands in unfavorable contrast with another indirect and logical mode of knowledge; *its* object is less valid than that determined by inference. So the contrast of *the* (so-called) real object with the fact "presented" in perception turns out to be the contrast of an object known through a logical way with one directly "apprehended." I do not adduce these considerations as showing that the case is hopeless for the presentative realist;[4] I am willing to concede he can find a satisfactory way out. But the difficulty exists; and in existing it calls emphatic attention to a case which is certainly and indisputably a case of knowledge—namely, propositions arrived at through inference—judgments as logical assertions.

With relation to this unquestionable case of knowledge, the logical or inferential, perceptions occupy a unique status, one which readily accounts for their being regarded as cases of knowledge, although in themselves they are merely natural events. (1) They are the sole ultimate data, the sole media, of inference to all natural objects and processes. While we do not, in any intelligible or verifiable sense, know *them*, we know all things that we do know *with* or *by* them. They furnish the only ultimate evidence of the existence and nature of the objects which we infer, and they are the sole ultimate checks and tests of the inferences. The visible light is the evidence on the basis of which we infer the existence, place, and structure of the astronomical star, and some other perception is the verifying check on the value of the inference. Because of this characteristic use of perceptions, the perceptions themselves acquire, by "second intention," a knowledge status. They *become* objects of minute, accurate, and experimental scrutiny. Since the body of propositions that forms natural science hangs upon them, *for scientific purposes* their nature *as* evidence, *as* signs, entirely overshadows their natural status, that of being simply natural events. The scientific man, as scientific, cares for perceptions not in themselves, but as they throw light upon the nature of some object reached by evidence. And

[4] This is the phase of the matter, of course, which the rationalistic or objective realist, the realist of the type of T. H. Green, emphasizes. Put in terms of systems, the difficulty adduced above is that in escaping the subjectivism latent in treating perception as a case of knowledge, the realist runs into the waiting arms of the objective idealist. And as a matter of fact, it is extremely difficult to find any differences—save verbal and psychological ones—between contemporary propositional realists—as G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell—and the classic type of objective idealists. Propositional realism I shall deal with in a later paper.

since every such inference tries to terminate in a further perception (as its test of validity), the *value* of knowing depends on perception. (2) Independent of science, daily life uses perceptions as signs of other perceptions. When a perception of a certain kind frequently recurs and is constantly used as evidence of some other impending perceptual event, the function of habit (a natural function, be it noted, not a psychical or epistemological function) often brings it about that the perception loses its original quality in acquiring a sign-value. Language is, of course, the typical case. Noises, in themselves mere natural events, through habitual use as signs of other natural events become integrated with what they mean. What they stand for is telescoped, as it were, into what they are. This happens also with other natural events, colors, tastes, etc. Thus, *for practical purposes,* many perceptual events are cases of knowledge; that is, they have been *used* as such so often that the habit of so using them is established or automatic.

In this brief reference to facts that are perfectly familiar, I have tried to suggest three points of crucial importance for a naïve realism: first, that the inferential or evidential function (that involving logical relation) is in the field as an obvious and undisputed case of knowledge; second, that this function, although embodying the logical relation, is itself a natural and specifically detectable process among natural things—it is not a non-natural or epistemological relation, that is, a relation to a mind or knower not in the natural series; third, that the *use,* practical and scientific, of perceptual events in the evidential or inferential function is such as to make them *become* cases of knowledge, and to such a degree that this acquired characteristic quite overshadows, in many cases, their primary nature.

If we add to what has been said the fact that, like every natural function, the inferential function turns out better in some cases and worse in others, we get a naturalistic or naïvely realistic conception of the "*problem* of knowledge": Control of the conditions of inference—the only type of knowledge detectable in direct existence—so as to guide it toward the better.

IV

I do not flatter myself that I will receive much gratitude from realists for attempting to rescue them from that error of fact which exposes their doctrine to an idealistic interpretation. The superstition, growing up in a false physics and physiology and perpetuated by psychology, that sensations-perceptions are cases of knowledge, is too ingrained. But—*crede experto*—let them try the experiment of conceiving perceptions as pure natural events, not as cases of aware-

ness and apprehension, and they will be surprised to see how little they miss—save the burden of confusing traditionary problems. Meantime, while philosophic argument such as this will do little to change the state of belief regarding perceptions, the development of biology and the refinement of physiology will, in due season, do the work.

On concluding my article, I ought to refer, in order to guard against misapprehension, to a reply that the presentative realist might make to my objection. He might say that while the seen light is a case of knowledge or presentative awareness, it is not a case of knowledge of the star, but simply of the seen light, just as it is. In this case the appeal to the physical explanations of the difference of the seen light from its objective source is quite legitimate. At first sight, such a position seems innocent and tenable. Even if innocent, it would, however, be ungrounded, since there is no evidence of the existence of a knower, and of its relation to the seen light. But further consideration will reveal that there is a most fundamental objection. If the notion of perception as a case of adequate knowledge of its own object-matter be accepted, the knowledge relation is absolutely ubiquitous; it is an all-inclusive net. The "ego-centric predicament" is inevitable. This result of making perception a case of knowing will occupy us in the second paper of this series.

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DISCUSSION

PETER'S TOOTHACHE ONCE MORE

THE non-pragmatist who, in spite of his unregenerate condition, still has an open mind and a real sympathy for the pragmatic spirit, will find much that is helpful in Professor Moore's recent and brilliantly written book, "Pragmatism and Its Critics." There are, however, a few questions—and among these some which he has been accustomed to consider rather crucial—concerning which he will come away from his reading with no great increase of comprehension. One of these questions, which Professor Moore evidently considers already so completely thrashed out as to need no further treatment from him, is the pragmatic meaning of "truth." In two or three passages he incidentally reaffirms the old formulas, but nowhere does he make any considerable effort to throw new light on the subject or to explain any of the difficulties connected with that much-debated term. This is unfortunate for a few of us who, in spite of sincere

study upon many pages of pragmatic writing, still have to admit that there is at least one difficulty outstanding, the explanation of which has never been made completely clear. The difficulty, in short, is this: If it be meaningless to define a true judgment as "one which represents its object as it really is," and if truth, therefore, is not to be conceived as correspondence, but identified, rather, with the process of verification, lying wholly within experience, what shall we do with the case of a judgment which is never verified but yet corresponds with its object—a judgment, that is, whose object is as the judgment thinks it? But perhaps, to make my meaning clear, I had best revert to an illustration which I used some time ago in this JOURNAL.[1]

The illustration was briefly this: Peter has a toothache, and John thinks Peter has a toothache. Now according to pragmatism, as I understand it, the truth of John's judgment does not consist in the correspondence between it and its object, but in the "experienced process" of its verification. So far all is clear. But now arise two possible difficulties. In the first place, let us suppose that John verifies his judgment only after Peter has cured his toothache. The state of things is then at least a little queer. For, according to the pragmatic view, John's judgment, "Peter has a toothache," was not true so long as Peter had the toothache, and became true only when Peter ceased to have the toothache. A more serious difficulty is the following: A third boy, Tom, thinks Peter has *not* a toothache. He tries to find out, but misinterprets Peter's words and actions, and finally concludes that he was quite right and thereafter lets the matter drop. His process of verification was perfectly satisfactory to him. His idea "worked" "in the way it set out to work." Was it therefore true? If not, why not? And if it was true, then were not two contradictory opposites both true at the same time and in the same sense?

In an article which appeared in this JOURNAL a year ago last July, Professor Moore promised to take up this toothache case "in another paper." I have been waiting for this "other paper" ever since. And to my disappointment, neither in Professor Moore's recent article in this JOURNAL on "How Ideas Work," nor anywhere in his new book, do I find any slightest attempt to help me out of my difficulties. Instead of keeping his promise, he proposes a perfectly new toothache case, about a man who had an ache and thought it was in his tooth and so went to the dentist and had it out. Here, of course, the pragmatist has no difficulty in demonstrating triumphantly that the idea, "The tooth is the cause of the pain," led the

[1] Vol. IV., pp. 322–24. It also appears in "What is Pragmatism?" pp. 70, 117–121.

man to the dentist's, and so was verified. Of course this is all true, but it so completely avoids all the difficulties of my toothache case that I am quite as much in the dark as ever.

As Professor Moore refuses to help me in this matter, I have searched for what help I could get from the other pragmatists. Professor James has this much to say that is revelant to Peter's toothache: "The critic's trouble seems to come from his taking the word 'true' irrelatively, whereas the pragmatist always means 'true for him who experiences the workings.' 'But is the object *really* true or not?' the critic then seems to ask—as if the pragmatist were bound to throw in a whole ontology on top of his epistemology and tell us what realities indubitably exist. 'One world at a time,' would seem to be the right reply here."[2]

In similar fashion Dr. Schiller writes: "The argument about 'correspondence,' 'Peter,' etc., seems to me to beg the question, because you *assume* that one can know what the reality, or the real truth, is apart from our human modes of getting at it. But this is just the crux. Our systematic challenge is—What right have you to take for granted the reality of what you have no means of knowing? It is so far just the Kantian question, How know? applied consistently. The only inference you are entitled to draw from your example is that Peter *may* have a toothache but there is a dispute about it."[3]

If these criticisms are to be taken as in any sense answers to my difficulty and as explanations of the toothache case, it must be simply because they deny my right to suppose at the same time a Tom with his idea and a Peter with his ache. "How do you *know* that Peter had a toothache?" ask Dr. Schiller and Professor James. And the answer, of course, is: I don't; I only *suppose* he has. That was my *hypothetical case.* Now if you grant that I have a right to my illustration and that it is a possible case, then you are bound to tell me how Tom's verified idea that Peter had no toothache was true when as a fact Peter did have a toothache. And if my case is impossible, and it is altogether uncertain whether there be anything outside of Tom's own experience to which it is bound to conform in order to be true, then are we not heading straight for solipsism? If there are other sentient beings beside myself concerning whose experiences I may form judgments, then the relation of those experiences to my judgments about them, although itself not experienced by any of us human beings, is certainly an important element in the problem whether my judgments are true. And if there be no such

[2] "The Meaning of Truth," p. 177.

[3] From a personal letter which Dr. Schiller permits me to quote. For a somewhat similar criticism see H. V. Knox in *Mind,* Vol. XVIII., p. 599.

relation it must be because there is *no other term* to which my judgment is related.

Now, lest I should be misunderstood by my pragmatist friends, let me hasten to explain that I have never for a moment believed that they were really solipsists, nor do I suppose that they seriously question my existence or each others'. I wish merely to point out that if one persists in holding to principles which are consistent only with solipsistic presuppositions, one can not get fully free from solipsism even by proclaiming upon the housetops one's enthusiastic adherence to the "social consciousness" view. It is all very well to insist that consciousness is social and public, and that self-consciousness arises only *pari passu* with consciousness of other selves. As Professor Moore points out, "My consciousness is a function of a social process in which my body or brain or mind is only one factor." This is all perfectly true. And yet, however interdependent our experiences may be, there is a sense in which my thought *is* private—*my* thought and not yours. As Professor James puts it, the breaches between "thoughts belonging to different personal minds . . . are the most absolute breaches in nature."[4] And if I deny the existence of an unexperienced relation between my thought and your experience and the relevancy of this relation to the truth of my thought, I certainly seem so far forth to be denying your experience.

In all which I may be completely mistaken. And if I am, will not some kind pragmatist friend take pity on me, and explain to me at last the real nature of truth as applied to Peter's toothache?

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REPLY TO PROFESSOR PRATT

SINCE Professor Pratt has failed to discover in my book, to which he courteously refers, anything relevant to his difficulties with Peter's toothache, I have little hope that he will find "help" in what I say here. This failure is symptomatic of the entire situation between Professor Pratt and the pragmatists. It means that Professor Pratt sees no connection between the origin, intent, and nature of ideas or judgment and the problem of truth. For the pragmatist the problem of the truth of ideas is bound up with that of their origin, nature, and intent. The result is that throughout the discussion the terms "idea," "judgment," "thinking," etc., mean one thing for the pragmatist and quite another for Professor Pratt. Hence each party seems to the other to be constantly begging the question. And it is futile to go on discussing the truth of ideas as if it were a per-

[4] "Psychology," p. 153.

fectly distinct and separate problem until we are agreed upon what an idea *is*. And if we were so agreed there would be little room left for disagreement about truth and error.

By "idea" and "judgment" Professor Pratt apparently means a "mental state" or "image" which through a relation "*not experienced by any of us human beings*" corresponds (or fails to correspond) to an object. (Italics mine.) For the pragmatist an idea or judgment is a form of interaction between beings that are *already* in some *other* (non-ideational, *e. g.*, instinctive, or perceptual) form of interaction which has fallen into conflict and uncertainty. To relieve this uncertainty the interaction assumes the reflective, judging form. For the pragmatist the entire origin, nature, intent, and verification of the judgment is defined with reference to this uncertainty in the already existing interactions. It is obvious that this kind of judgment does not require a relation "unexperienced by any of us mortals" to hitch it to its object. It emerges out of the *preceding* interaction already hitched to it. It is because John and Peter are already in some sort of interaction that John is capable of making any judgment whatever about Peter. If the relation between John's idea and Peter's pain is one outside the experience "of any of us human beings," how "on earth"—whatever it might do in this extra-human world—can John's idea aim at Peter at all?

So far as I can see, on Professor Pratt's view, if any one—sane or insane—should happen to have a mental image expressing itself in the words, "Peter Doe's eyes are green," and if, entirely apart from the origin and intent of this image, there happened to be somewhere, anywhere, in the universe, even beyond the experience "of any of us humans," a being with green eyes called by his cobeings "Peter Doe," we should have a judgment, according to Professor Pratt, and the judgment would be true. Now of course, as Professor H. W. Stuart has observed, there is nothing to prevent any one from cherishing this view of the judgment, if some sort of esthetic satisfaction is to be got from it; but what logical use is to be made of it is difficult to discover.

Proceeding with this notion of the judgment, Professor Pratt says that pragmatists have never met his difficulty of "a true but unverified judgment." And he might well have added, "And they can not meet it." They can not, that is, on its own terms. It is one of those surds which intellectualistic realism has in common with intellectualistic idealism and which the pragmatic movement "meets" by abolishing. It does this by finding that the judgment is an act *which includes verification in its intent*. Hence to submit the problem of "a true but unverified judgment" is, as Schiller says, to beg the whole issue. For the pragmatist no such case exists.

So, too, when Professor Pratt says that James and Schiller would deny him "the right to suppose, at the same time, a Tom with his idea and a Peter with his ache," he again overlooks the immense difference between his and James's and Schiller's conception of Tom's idea. What James and Schiller would deny is, not Tom with his idea, but Tom with *Professor Pratt's kind* of idea—*e. g.*, an idea consisting of an image whose relation to its object is "not experienced by any of us human beings," to say nothing of Tom.

Passing to the case of Peter, John, and Tom, Professor Pratt finds that in discussing, in my book, Peter's idea of his own ache, I have substituted "a perfectly new case" which "completely avoids all the difficulties" of the Peter-John and the Peter-John-Tom cases. Here I can only insist upon the identity in logical type, to which I called attention in a footnote, between Peter's judgment of his own ache and John's and Tom's judgments of it. Surely Peter is quite as likely to misdiagnose his own ache as is John or Tom—perhaps more so if John and Tom happen to be good physicians. Peter may think that a certain tooth is the cause of the ache, when it is not, just as John or Tom may think Peter has the toothache when he hasn't. Peter's difficulty and liability to error in judging his own ache are, in principle, just the same as John's and Tom's, and have to be met in the same way. Peter's ache and tooth are just as much (and as little) "realistically" related to his own ideas as to John's and Tom's.

If what I have just said about the identity in type of Peter's judgment about his own ache and John's and Tom's judgments about it holds, it ought to be sufficient to point Professor Pratt, in his difficulty with the latter, to the method which he admits works "so triumphantly" in the former. He would then find that there is no more difficulty with the opposed judgments of John and Tom, *provided they are taken pragmatically,* than with the different and opposed hypotheses which any one makes in his own mind in the course of an investigation. John's and Tom's judgments are but parts of a process of *interaction,* just as are the competing hypotheses in the thinking of any single investigator.

If Professor Pratt says: "But the judgments of John and Tom are not mere hypotheses; they are 'verified' judgments and John and Tom are 'satisfied' with them," the reply is: (1) these judgments are not "verified"—they are not even judgments unless they are expressions of uncertainty in interaction between John and Tom; (2) if they are such expressions and if the contradiction is *known* to John and Tom, obviously the verification and satisfaction can not be complete; (3) if the investigation of each is independent of and unknown to the other, even so, if John and Tom are good pragmatists, their "verification" and "satisfaction" will still be a "working"

verification and satisfaction, and as such will always be open to reconstruction. In other words, the difference between hypothesis and verification is again a relative—a "working" one. Hypothesis and verification are not absolute and exclusive qualities, but developmental stages of the judgment. The hypothetical judgment expresses the ambiguous and conflicting, the verified judgment the unified and definite *response,* to Peter's actions. Verification marks the passage from the thinking, judging form of *response* to the stage of preparedness to act. If the response from the beginning is perfectly definite and unquestioned, then it is not, for the pragmatist, a judgment. It is simply some form of a direct, unreflective reaction.

Doubtless Professor Pratt will say, "Admitting the element of intent and response in the judgment, is not the intent of this response an intent to correspond to the object 'as it really is?'" But just what does this mean? (1) The "correspondence" must stop short of identity with the object. It can not even pretend to "copy" it. This being the case, what *kind* of verification can it possibly have other than finding that when Peter is treated as having a toothache he responds (co-responds) in a certain way? Is not this all the correspondence and verification the idea expects or wants? And speaking of solipsism, would not a demand for the other sort of correspondence and verification mean a desire to *be* Peter's toothache, and end in a complete absorption of Peter and finally of everything else into the idea? Does not a purely *intellectualistic* realism inevitably end in the same solipsism, and by the same token, in the same absolutism, as intellectualistic idealism? (2) "The object as it really is"—what is this? Is it the pain as it is for Peter, or as it is for John, or as it is in the interaction between Peter and John? The pragmatist's answer is that the latter is what the object "really is" *in the judgment.* What it is for Peter alone may be just as "real"—only it is not *that* reality that is undergoing judgment.

Doubtless Professor Pratt will find that all this "shifts the ground." And so it does. I see no way of meeting Professor Pratt's difficulties "on their own ground." And I wonder if Professor Pratt does. How does *he* settle the contradiction between John and Tom? For the experimental theory, these opposing judgments, *so long as they are opposed,* are still working hypotheses, and as such are subject to further experimentation. What are they for Professor Pratt? How does Professor Pratt decide between John and Tom? For let us remember that he can not here appeal to "what works." That already stands condemned by his entire article. What then? The only passage in the above of Professor Pratt's which bears on this is interesting. In answer to the ques-

tion, "How do you know that Peter has a toothache?" Professor Pratt says: "The answer is, I don't. I only suppose he has," and then he says, "You are bound to tell me how Tom's verified idea that Peter had no toothache was true, when *as a fact* [italics mine] Peter did have a toothache." Apparently Professor Pratt regards it as impossible to "know" whether Peter has the toothache, but easy to tell when "it is a fact."

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Direction of Desire: Suggestions for the Application of Psychology to Everyday Life. STANLEY M. BLIGH. London: Henry Frowde. 1910. Pp. xii + 360.

This book on "The Direction of Desire" addresses itself to those who have already an interest in such a discussion. Its nature and intention are frankly declared in the preface. "This book makes no claim to be scientific in the strict sense of the word. It aims chiefly at suggesting new lines of inquiry with regard to the alteration of the tone of consciousness, where that is desired. It is hoped that it may be found useful by those who have no time or inclination for reading longer and more serious works on psychology, but who at the same time have an interest, either for their own sake or for that of others, in investigating the possibilities of the human personality. . . . The object aimed at throughout has been to call attention to the possible uses of what has been named 'directive' psychology." (Preface, pp. iii and iv.)

Mr. Bligh feels himself to be a pioneer in the field of "directive" psychology, and in this character asks indulgence and cooperation of the readers of the book. "The facts upon which theories or principles in regard to the matters here discussed could be established with any high degree of probability have," he thinks, "yet to be collected. Perhaps a hope may be entertained that this book may lead to their being more accurately ascertained. . . . The personal experiences of those who may feel any interest in attaining self-direction, and in recording their efforts in regard to it, would, if obtainable, form the basis for a more complete and useful study of various problems which have been so roughly outlined in these pages." (Preface, p. iv.)

Of the difficulties which beset the path of a pioneer in such an undertaking Mr. Bligh is fully conscious. Directive psychology will, he recognizes, have to meet "all sorts of criticisms and objections. Perhaps the chief of these objections is the prejudice against self-experimentation in moral matters. The sacredness of the emotional life is held as a kind of dogma by many people with an intensity which is only equaled by its vagueness. . . . Our emotional nature is half consciously regarded as sent

us by Providence for its own purposes; it is thought that we must not tamper with it lest we weaken it, that we must not even inspect its workings too closely lest we get morbidly introspective and our blood turn to water" (p. 3). "Now," he continues, "directive psychology goes dead in the face of these old prejudices. It would set before itself for solution two main questions, how self-consciousness can be made a blessing to its possessors, and how people can be enabled . . . to follow their own reasoned and sincere choice in matters of thought and conduct, with as little hindrance as possible from their lower passions and tendencies; no observations, no experiments," he adds, "which tended to help in the attainment of these ends would be considered either impious or dangerous, or derogatory to human dignity" (p. 4).

Directive psychology is, then, concerned with the production by the means of suggested recommendations of a change in the personality; it is "applied psychology" (p. 3). Mr. Bligh thus describes its peculiar interest: "Following the lines of applied sociology, it would seek to produce in the human personality artificial phenomena consciously and intentionally directed. The personality would be studied not so much to understand the mechanism by which the sensations are aroused, or the ways in which they are combined and worked up (all that being in the province of pure psychology), but to discover the causes of the inefficiencies and of the discontents, and to provide practical remedies for them" (p. 3).

It has seemed worth while to set forth chiefly in Mr. Bligh's own words the scope and interest of the discussion in order to exhibit its particular appeal, and to present the point of view and the purpose of the book uncolored by interpretation and unimpaired by criticism. The further discussion of the contents and method of the book will necessarily involve some consideration of the feasibility of the attempt here made and examination of the ground on which the plan rests. To this more critical view we are invited by inadequacies disclosed on a closer study of the subject-matter, and by doubts and difficulties evoked by the method of treatment. These inadequacies and difficulties it is somewhat hard to state plainly without seeming to refuse appreciation to this study of the possible uses of a directive psychology, which is, in truth, stimulating and of wide interest. I wish, then, to preface this further comment by remarking, in addition to the intrinsic interest of the subject-matter, the range of Mr. Bligh's observations, the keenness of his analysis of certain types of individuals and of his comment on certain social conditions, and the moderation and frequent trenchancy of his expression. Mr. Bligh has in this discussion evinced desire and ability to demonstrate with emphasis some truths and facts generally held to be "obvious" and disregarded on that account, which have consequences significant for the individual and for society. It is in these valuations, these criticisms and suggestive comments, and in the sense and weight of independent thought and observation, that the strength and interest of the book chiefly lie. The facts and conditions which are here presented command the reflective attention of every one who in any educative capacity is concerned with human

welfare. Mr. Bligh's repeated emphasis on the dependence of the attitude towards the development of the personality upon the philosophic outlook on the universe, his contention that there "should be a definite education of the power of synthesizing the aims" of the individual, his suggestion of a "more definite instruction in the use of leisure," his plea for the recognition of the social utility of "the more unusual forms of capacity for certain work requiring originality of thought," his insight into what he has termed "the social pressures" brought to bear upon the individual—all merit the thoughtful consideration of persons interested in the liberation and development of the potentialities of the individual.

Mr. Bligh's contention has the strength due to origin in beliefs and assumptions which are familiar and currently accepted. Moreover, he disarms prejudice as he proceeds by a frank and unreserved recognition of the difficulties and complexities of the undertaking. Yet the danger-point of the venture is, apparently, hidden from his sight. It may be located in the fundamental conception of the nature and operation of "directive" psychology, in the conviction of the need for systematic and special applications to "practical" conditions of the principles of "pure" psychology. Given this belief, it is clear that with the attempt to set forth the facts and conditions which render these recommendations important, would go the attendant necessity of setting forth also in some degree the "pure" psychological principles in order to give to the recommendations authority and carrying power. So that Mr. Bligh, by reason of the exigencies of his theory, has here on his hands the double necessity of describing ways and means, and of giving a brief, condensed exposition of principles which will justify and explain the methods suggested. These explanatory accounts seem, however, sometimes dubitable in the light of the results of recent experimental and analytical psychology. The difficulty might be attributed to the restriction arising from the plan and method of the discussion, were it not for the fact that some of Mr. Bligh's educational doctrines might, I think, with reason be questioned from a psychological point of view.

With his eye on the problem of devising and expounding methods designed to meet certain limitations in the personality, Mr. Bligh considers various types of persons, classified according to their temperament and attitudes towards various fundamental subjects, and discusses the benefits possible to these persons by the help of directive psychology. Classification of people, which is necessarily not exhaustive in our present complex and varied society, when made the sole basis of a consideration of methods of psychological direction and betterment, is inevitably unstable and must seem unfruitful and unauthoritative. However, Mr. Bligh has faith in his diagnosis, and prescriptions are given for the types of persons which he discriminates.

Further: the "immense variety of personality," which Mr. Bligh himself notes, necessitates a more or less hurried and topical treatment of a large range of subjects. Often all that may be done within the limitations of a chapter which has to consider many facts and conditions, is to

call our attention by a brief statement to a conception which *would* repay further development and reflection.

Perhaps the foregoing analysis of the method of procedure in suggesting the applications of the principles of psychology to everyday life has shown cause why the book, despite the value and suggestiveness of many of its discussions, is hard to read consecutively. Contrary to expectation and to interest in the themes, one lays it down after about fifty pages, surfeited with recommendations. Yet certain of the observations and many of the points noted are of sufficient vitality and pertinency to recur to one often in the course of subsequent reflections and experiences.

It is, perhaps, quite consistent with the point of view which conceives of principles of action as principles of "pure" psychology, having in themselves no practical character or bearing, but needing to be specially applied to typical cases and conditions, to hold that ethical considerations, opinions of right and wrong, constitute again a special province and are *per se* not involved in a consideration of modes of action desirable for the individual, so that the recommendations of directive psychology can, therefore, not be ethically determining (p. 7). Directive psychology has, however, as Mr. Bligh is at pains to point out (p. 76), a "kind of relationship" with "certain ethical systems," which is "based on the fact that directive psychology aims at sublimating and recombining the elementary tendencies of the personality to the end that it may become harmonious and stable, and that harmony and stability are to some extent ethical qualities." Further: in its social aspect directive psychology "aims at showing how a reconciliation may be effected between the interests of the personality considered as a self-contained individuality, and the same personality considered as part of the social organism." The difference, and, as it would appear, the advantage, of directive psychology over any ethical system lies for Mr. Bligh in the fact that it "ceases to advocate high-sounding ethical principles unless and until it has first created tastes and impulsions which will make those principles operative, and," he adds, "it can only make them operative when it has shown that in relation to particular types of personality they may be objects of desire" (p. 78). It seems to me that in this last statement is exhibited the confusion in thought which militates against the success of Mr. Bligh's interesting venture. To refrain from urging ethical principles until it is possible to appeal to some desire or interest for them, and meanwhile to rouse and stimulate that interest and desire, is on the face of it a wise and sane plan; but to set forth as a tenet that ethical principles can only "be made operative" when shown as desirable objects to certain types of persons, is to make the motivation to moral action singularly dependent upon the demonstrations of a science of "directive" psychology. A more ardent belief in the fostering of these desires and inclinations, coupled with a recognition that these ethical principles are, if anywhere, to be discovered in the "habits and impulses of the individual," would conceivably make such demonstration unnecessary. But the pronouncement that a presentation of ethical principles as "objects of desire" on the part of certain types of people is the sole means of making

them "operative" with others, seemingly is required of Mr. Bligh by his theory of the unpractical and unapplied character of principles, ethical or psychological. For clearly a belief in the possibility of analysis of the data of psychology which would reveal moral implications and disclose practical consequences for the individual rests on the conviction of the practical character and the ethical significance of the data it examines. And by Mr. Bligh's initial assumption this belief is prohibited.

The book is justly entitled to the description given to it of the science of "applied psychology." The foregoing discussion is intended to raise the question whether a science of directive psychology, so described, is possible theoretically or profitable practically. In the attempt made by this book to carve out the field for this new science concerned with human welfare, and tentatively to describe its methods and purposes, there is certainly value and importance. The wideness and sincerity of Mr. Bligh's interest in his subject, together with the incisiveness and independence of many of his comments and observations, bespeak a spirit and strength that will distance objections and obstacles. The suggestion made in this review of a need for the redetermination of the underlying assumption on which the structure of this new science has been erected, springs from the belief that the conception of a given separation between science and experience steals the force and meaning from any attempt to deal rationally with life problems. It is difficult to see how it would be possible to formulate a science of "directive" psychology until conviction obtained of the inherent capability of "psychology" *for* directing. A consideration of the direction of the desires and habits of the individual is of undoubted and unexhausted value and importance. It is possible, however, that such a consideration should be "scientific in the strict sense of the word"; that it should concern itself with analyses of psychological data to determine their practical and ethical implications and consequences; and that it should, in the interests of human welfare, suggest lines of action and of inquiry which would test and modify psychological "principles," and maintain a philosophic consideration of their actual value and function in life.[1]

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The Concept of Method. GERHARD R. LOMER. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University. *Contributions to Education,* No. 34. 1910. Pp. 99.

This little book is packed full of thought on the philosophy of method. The author believes that the stress on scientific method, while marking an advance in the progress of education, has too often led to an undue emphasis on the minutiæ of experience, and that consequently we have failed to attain to an organic view of the method of experience itself.

[1] For a consideration of the directions of the desires and habits of the individual, see Part II., "Theory of the Moral Life," by John Dewey, in "Ethics," by John Dewey and James H. Tufts; and also Professor Dewey's "How We Think."

A philosophical analysis of the method of experience at different stages of the development of the race and also at different stages in the life of the child would show underlying uniformities which should be determinative of the method of education.

The underlying point of view that determines the investigation which Dr. Lomer makes is dominantly that which Dewey has made familiar to us in his "The Child and the Curriculum," and in a less formal way in his "School and Society." The actual experience of the child is to be the starting-point in our discussion of the educational process. But experience is not some sort of entity which we may watch unfold or develop. It is an activity, a process. The reconstruction of experience which we call its development and organization goes on in terms of the interaction between the child with all his infinite promises and unrealized potentialities, on the one hand, and on the other, the social media through which alone these can be realized. These two are the terminal aspects of the educational process. There has been a strong tendency to view education in terms of one of these aspects dominantly, to the undue neglect of the other. If we fall in line with the organic and functional conceptions which are becoming current, we shall avoid this error and see that the fundamental method of education consists in the interaction between the two. The method of education must be conceived as identical with the method of experience itself, namely that of giving form to the experience of the child, only with the addition of such guidance and direction as will realize at the same time both individual development and social efficiency. The general plan of the book is as follows: to attack the problem of the method of human experience, which is also the method of education, through the analysis of several historical systems of thought; to follow this by enough analysis of the theory of evolution to see the significance of the organic conception; and then to sum up in discussions of "The Interpretation of Experience" and "The Function of Method."

The historical systems of the interpretation of experience chosen as typical for this study are those of the Greeks, Bacon, Descartes, Comenius, and Kant. The Greeks analyzed almost every aspect of human experience, the nature of the universe, the nature of man's experience, and the problem of human conduct. The author's discussion of the Greeks culminates in the philosophy of Plato, in which the method of experience is conceived as that of realizing through definite stages of progress from ignorance to wisdom the ultimate "Ideas." This method of experience is determinative, then, for Plato of the method of education. It is hard to understand why the author did not touch at this point upon Plato's account of education in the "Republic," and show in what respects it conforms to his analysis of the method of experience. It is interesting, however, to find him departing from the conception of Plato's philosophy as wholly static, and finding in it a dynamic and functional element. For some reason not apparent Mr. Lomer does not mention Aristotle in this analysis of Greek thought, although at several points in his later discussion he uses Aristotelian conceptions and

harmonizes them with the modern ideas of the organic nature of experience.

With Bacon the emphasis falls on the method of knowledge. His significance from the point of view of an analysis of the method of experience lies in the fact that he emphasized the method of experience as based upon an empirical knowledge of the phenomena of nature. Descartes is significant from the point of view of his emphasis on the method of personal experience. Starting with immediate experience, he seeks to arrive by the process of analysis of this experience at a true method for its organization, interpretation, and evaluation. With him knowledge and reality as aspects of experience can not be separated; they are integral parts of one organic whole. Reality becomes, then, primarily the reality of a *process* rather than one of fact. Comenius emphasized still further the organic nature of experience, especially in relation to the problem of education. "Comenius embodies in an admirable way the first tentative efforts towards the functional conception of education as a phase of human experience."

Kant concerned himself with a criticism of the process of experience itself with reference to determining its limitations and its positive functions. Mr. Lomer sums up the chief implications which his writings have for the problem of method as follows: "(1) His analysis of the character and the nature of human knowledge, though it is carried on rather from the structural point of view, does involve a consideration of the *method* of knowledge as an essential phase. Knowledge must be related to virtuous action; theory and practise are interrelated phases of experience. (2) Kant emphasizes the fundamental creative power of the human mind. Method is a phase of an evolutionary experience. Education is genetic only if it is at the same time teleological. Self-activity is the fundamental method of education."

The theory of evolution Mr. Lomer uses to give an organic interpretation to causation, theory of knowledge, and teleology. "Evolution is another term for 'universal' experience—it is *causation in activity.* . . . Causation is a principle, and it can therefore have no reality unless it is regarded as a function. . . . Causation is the method by which a universe of powers, potentialities, and promises realizes itself. Causation is the potentiality, the dunamis, 'energizing,' actualizing itself, making reality. . . . The nature of the thing, its true end, is its development, its evolution, its self-realization in the highest *form* to which its potentiality is capable of reaching. . . . The whole machinery of the universe is machinery only to the mechanically-minded man. To the evolutionist it is a vast, an infinitely vast, growing, living organism." Applying to epistemology the same line of thought as has been applied to causation makes necessary such a readjustment of the point of view of the relation of subject and object that this relation becomes *organic* as well as logical. Knowledge receives a functional interpretation in which its dominant aspect is that of an *activity.* When we get away from the narrow anthropomorphic interpretation of teleology, teleology is made manifest in the cosmic process. Evolution may be considered

as the rational process of cosmical organization and teleology as the science which shows all facts in their necessary causal relations to one another, in organic and functional terms, as parts of a rational scheme of development.

Dr. Lomer uses the historical study and the discussion of the theory of evolution to lead up to his own interpretation of experience. In the light of the previous discussions it becomes evident that the analysis of experience into hard-and-fast and sharply separated kinds is not justified. Distinctions inevitably arise in the process of experience, because experience is a moving active affair in which oppositions, conflicts, problems arise in the interaction of self and environment; but such distinctions are functional and relative to the particular kind of situation with which we have to deal. From the genetic point of view there are three such inevitable distinctions in the complete development of experience. They are self-unconsciousness, self-consciousness, and self-realization. These, I take it, represent different stages in the process of adjustment between the self and its environment. They are modes of experience, not different kinds of experience, and as such are organically related to one another and to the whole process of activity as functionally determining the reorganization of experience. This same line of thought is applied to the category of existence as it functions in experience. There are three levels of existence, organically related to one another, those of mere existence, of potentiality, and of activity. This does not mean, however, that there are three different kinds of existence which enter into our experience, but that there is an ascending scale of values in experience of which we become conscious. The consciousness of values implicitly involves the emergence of standards. The standard is not something external, however, but it also is functionally determined. Various classes of standards are to be distinguished in terms of the functions to be performed in the process of experience as we are confronted with *problems* as to (1) *what* we do, (2) *why* we do it, (3) *how* we do it. The significance for education of this discussion of distinctions within experience as functionally determined seems to be that the educational process is not to be conceived of as a mechanical matter of static elements, whether materials of the curriculum or "faculties" and "powers" of the mind, but rather that we must find the principle of activity and the processes of personality which give dynamic character to the situations in which materials of the curriculum and mental powers will have a functional value. This will have its bearing also on our conception of ends. From this point of view ends are not merely ends; they, too, have a functional significance which gives them pragmatic vitality. Even the mechanical and the teleological interpretations of nature can be harmonized on the basis of this conception of the nature of ends. They merely represent specialized points of view of the same set of facts, the first the point of view of the facts and their relations, the second that of the idea, or form, of which they are the progressive realization.

In his discussion of the function of method, Mr. Lomer attempts to

"show that theory and practise are not two separate entities brought into relation in the course of experience . . . but differentiated aspects in every phase of individual and social activity . . . complementary phases of the function of intelligence in experience." Education can not safely either ignore conscious theory or make theory something external to and imposed upon practise. "Our experience is an organic part of our personality, and our theory and our practise are organic parts of our experience." In like manner education must seek the unity of the genetic and the teleological interpretations of the child and of the teaching process by taking the functional point of view. The two things, the developing child and the ideal of education, must be realized in their organic relation. "It is through this process of interaction that social purposes gain reality, and it is through the same process that the immature potentialities of the children gain ideal value." But inasmuch as the nature of experience furnishes the conditions under which standards, as we have seen, differentiate to perform a function, so also is it a function of method to control experience in harmony with these standards. Control is thus from the functional point of view not an arbitrary, external thing, but is only another expression of the harmonization of the mechanical with the teleological whereby the end is realized through a series of steps marked by order or method. The whole discussion is brought at its conclusion into relation with the two great fundamental ideas of evolution and idealism.

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The Apocryphal Acts of Paul, Peter, John, Andrew, and Thomas. BERNHARD PICK. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1909.

In Vol. XVI. of the *Ante-Nicene Christian Library* appeared (1870) a translation by Alexander Walker of the principal "Apocryphal Gospels, Acts, and Revelations," thirty-three in number. Since then scholarship has been unceasingly at work on this forbidding mass of material, which itself has grown meanwhile considerably in bulk, and far more in the import that unbiased judgment must assign it. In 1883–87–90 was issued the monumental three-volume treatise of Lipsius on "Die apokryphen Apostelgeschichten und Apostellegenden," followed in 1901 by the even more monumental "Acta Apostolorum Apocrypha" of Lipsius and Bonnet—a stately work of 1,167 pages, a worthy sequent to the "Novum Testamentum Graece" of Tischendorf. Close on the heels of these came (1904) the two extraordinarily compendious tomes edited by Hennecke, "Handbuch zu den neutestamentlichen Apokryphen" and the "Neutestamentliche Apokryphen" translated. Almost at the same time the great Egyptologist C. Schmidt still further enriched this literature with two editions of the "Acta Pauli," edited and translated from the Coptic. It is clear, then, without further mention of critical publications, that the time was fulfilled, and that the English reader might justly ask to be put abreast with the march of investigation in this region.

It is to such a demand that Dr. Pick, already known by his "Extra-canonical Life of Christ" (1903) and his "Paralipomena" (1908), has responded in useful, laudable, and thankworthy, if not in complete, measure by the publication of the book in hand. It is based avowedly on the critical editions of Lipsius, Bonnet, and Schmidt, and it is said that "the work of Edgar Hennecke has been of great help"—in fact, this latter would appear to have been so largely regulative as to deserve fully such explicit acknowledgment.

On examination, the translation itself would seem to be in the main excellently done. Nevertheless, careful scrutiny discloses occasional lapses, sometimes due apparently to over-reliance on the version of Walker. Thus, in the very beginning we read: "As Paul was going up to Iconium after his flight from Antioch, his fellow-travelers were Demas and Hermogenes, the coppersmith, full of hypocrisy, and persisted in staying with Paul, as if they loved him." Such English has certainly a queer ring. The word *were* renders neither the German *wurden* nor the Greek ἐγενήθησαν (*became*). The meaning would seem to be that D. and H. "joined him on the way and persisted in staying." In the story of the rapt attention of Thamyris "sitting at the window close by," the omission of the specification "of her house" (*ihres Hauses, τοῦ δίκου*) leaves one in doubt as to the whole scene, as to whether the window was in her house or in that of Onesiphorus, where Paul was preaching. In the "Martyrdom of Paul" (page 48), "persecutors" (*διωκόντων*) should be "pursuers," and "persecute" should be "pursue," for Longus and Cestus were believers, pursuing merely to join, and to receive "the seal of the Lord." In the "Acts of Peter" (page 60) the Latin words are indeed dark enough, but hardly so dark as the English: "and hast added to thy grace a bond connected with the whole world." The obscurity is cleared up in a measure by Usener's suggestion that the *e*'s be omitted from *gratiae tuae*. On page 71 the same word *traderet* is rendered by "betrayed" in connection with Judas, but correctly by "deliver" in connection with Caiaphas, which seems to do injustice to the "co-apostle," whose sobriquet Iskariot appears to mean *deliverer-up*. Page 74, "He had no words with which he otherwise deceived those present," the sense of the Latin being, "He failed of words with which he was wont to deceive bystanders." Page 76, "But I believe that by repenting he will have mercy on me," where the Latin declares, "He will pity me, a (*or* if) penitent." The last words of Peter on the cross are dun enough for Heraclitus, but "Having been drawn down who cast his origin upon the earth," seems to test the capacity of English syntax rather severely. Enough of such examples!

More careful proofreading was due a work of such learning. Not only are mistakes in number and person of verbs too frequent, along with such lapses as "take *a* hold" and "form*er* comeliness," but sense-disturbing errors detain the reader and at times defy. Thus, in the long quotation (page ix), "And so almost every fresh editor of such narratives, using that freedom which all antiquity was wont to allow itself in dealing with literary monuments, would reveal the materials which lay before him, excluding whatever, etc.," the word "reveal" remains a riddle till, on

turning to the *Einleitung* of Lipsius, it is found to represent the German "gestaltete," and accordingly should be "revise." More serious is the state of the case on page 115, line 10, where three lines in the Greek, two and one half lines in the German, have been omitted, the eye having wandered from σταυρῶσαι in line 9 to the same word in line 12.

Extremely diligent and wide-read as the translator undoubtedly is, Mrs. Lewis's edition of an old Syriac palimpsest of the Acts of Thomas and Reitzenstein's treatment of the metrical portions of the same Acts, would seem to have escaped him.

On the whole, then, with such trivial reservations in detail, the work of Dr. Pick is to be warmly commended as both timely and valuable, and hope is indulged that he may be encouraged to extend such labors much further over the broad field of the Apocrypha. By their very defects these repellent remains are instructive and even momentous, for they show by unanimous and cumulative testimony how Christian origins were treated when conceived in strict historiographic fashion, and the contrast with the New Testament treatment goes far towards refuting the *Historismus* so long uncontested in Germany, which Bousset, however, perceives is now no longer defensible.

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TULANE UNIVERSITY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. February, 1911. *Il Motuproprio "Sacrorum Antistitum"* (pp. 2–14): CARD. P. MAFFI. – A defense of Pius X's "Motu-proprio" against the criticisms of Catholic theological students. *Il ritorno alle idee madri del sapere umano* (pp. 15–23): G. ALLIEVO. – Mind and matter, soul and body, are the two poles of the created universe and the cardinal ideas upon which our whole knowledge is based. *Saggio di esposizione sintetica del pragmatismo religioso di W. James e di F. C. S. Schiller* (pp. 24–33): E. CHIOCCHETTI. – An exposition of the pragmatic proofs of God's existence, as formulated by James and Schiller. *Univocità od analogia?* (pp. 34–49): G. M. PETAZZI, S.J. – The concept of being, when applied to God and creatures, is not univocal—as maintained by Belmond and Duns Scotus—but analogical. *Giacomo Balmes e il problema della certezza* (pp. 50–68): F. PALHORIÈS. – An exposition of Balmes's theory of certainty. *Note e discussioni. Cronaca scientifica. Tribuna libera. Analisi d'opere.* Hoenning, *Elementi di filosofia. Filosofia morale:* G. TREDICI. Fr. Pius La Scala, *Cursus Philosophicus ad usum Seminariorum:* FR. GENTILE. Fr. Klimke, S.J., *Die Hauptprobleme der Weltanschauung:* A. B. Kostyleff, *La crise de la psychologie expérimentale. Le présent et l'avenir:* A. GEMELLI. Bonniot, *Le problème du mal:* F. CHOVEZ. Bernardi, *Esame dei fondamenti del modernismo:* G. SCHIAVON. Acri, *Dialettica turbata e serena:* R. FUSARI. G. Saitta, *La Scolastica nel secolo XVI e la poli-*

tica dei Gesuiti: G. MATTIUSSI, S.J. Tredici, *Breve corso di storia della filosofia:* G. NOGARA. *Note bibliografiche. Tra riviste e libri. Notiziario. Sommario ideologico.*

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. March, 1911. *La notion moderne de l'intuition et la philosophie des mathématiques* (pp. 145–176): L. BRUNSCHVIEG. – An interpretation of the definition and place of intuition in modern mathematics. *Cabanis et les origines de la vie psychologique* (pp. 177–198): F. COLONNA D'ISTRIA. – The contribution of Cabanis to the reaction initiated by Maine de Biran against Condillac and in favor of the more spontaneous causes of mental life. *Les judgements hypothétiques* (pp. 199–210): E. GOBLOT. – A reduction of hypothetical judgments to three types—where the subjects of the antecedents and consequents are different, where the antecedent and consequent have the same definite subject, and where they have the same indefinite subject. *La logique et la pratique* (pp. 211–236): J. M. BALDWIN. – A continuation of the exposition of the author's "Genetic Logic" begun in this JOURNAL, July, 1910. *Études critiques.* A. Fouillée, *Le socialisme et la sociologie réformiste:* E. VAN BIÉMA. *Discussions. Sur le principe d'induction mathématique:* A. PADOA. *Sur le principe d'induction mathématique:* E. WICKERSHEIMER. *Sur la logique de la théorie des nombres:* G. VACCA. *Questions pratiques. Les incertitudes de la philosophie du droit:* G. AILLET. *Supplément.*

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. March, 1911. *La contagion mentale* (pp. 225–244): G. DUMAS. – A discussion of the various senses in which the term *mental contagion* has been used, resulting in a limitation of it to a nervous trouble due to psychic infection. *L'illusion de Müller-Lyer et son double méchanisme* (pp. 245–284): H. PIÉRON. – A study of the different forms of this illusion, the theories that have been proposed concerning it, and a critical conclusion in favor of a double mechanism of illusion. *Recherches sur l'attention* (pp. 285–312): R. D'ALLONNES. – An attempt at a methodological program for the investigation of the phenomena of attention. *Analyses et comptes rendus: L'année philosophique, XXe année:* J. DELVAILLE. Ramousse, *Le phénomène de l'anarchie intellectuelle dans la conscience moderne:* PALANTE. De Sarlo et Calo, *La patalogia mental in rapporto all'etica e al diritto:* J. SEGOND. Fouillée, *La démocratie politique et sociale en France:* D. PARODI. Le Bon, *La psychologie politique et la défense sociale:* G. L. DUPRAT. Edwin Seligman, *L'interprétation économique de l'histoire:* DR. S. JANKELEVITCH. Del Veccio, *Il fenomeno della guerra:* DR. S. JANKELEVITCH. Péladan, *La philosophie de Léonard de Vinci:* L. ARRÉAT. A. Levy, *David Strauss: la vie et l'œuvre:* L. ARRÉAT. E. Zeller, *Kleine Schriften:* M. SOLOVINE.

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NOTES AND NEWS

THE late Professor His, of Leipzig, conceived the idea of establishing in each country a central institute which should have for its chief aim the organization and the coordination of biological research in its own territory, and serve as a means of cooperation with similar institutions in other countries. In other words, his far-reaching scheme implied the establishment of a regular organized army to attack the problems of living matter, which are being assailed at present only by the wasteful methods of guerilla warfare. During the last decade this proposal has been put to a practical test in the United States and Europe (excepting Great Britain) by the establishment, or the recognition, of certain institutions as centers for coordinating researches upon the brain, under the direction of the "Brain Commission" of the International Association of Academies. The success already attained in this domain of biology has encouraged others to follow in the footsteps of the neurologists. During

Whit-week a conference was held in the zoological laboratory of the University of Utrecht for the purpose of founding an International Embryological Institute. Austria, Belgium, England, France, Germany, and Holland were represented at the meeting by workers in the domain of vertebrate embryology; and letters were received from Switzerland and the United States in support of the scheme adumbrated by the conveners of the meeting. Professor R. Bonnet, of Bonn, was elected first president of the institute, and it was decided that the first aims of the new institution should be (1) the collection of complete series of well-preserved embryos of every mammalian order, and (2) a more intimate cooperation between embryologists, for the purpose of attaining a uniformity in nomenclature and the solution of the special difficulties in this field of investigation—*Nature.*

THE Sarah Berliner Research Fellowship for Women (an annual fellowship of $1,000 "open to women holding the degree of doctor of philosophy or to those similarly equipped," and "available for study and research in physics, chemistry, or biology") and the biennial prize of $1,000 offered by the Naples Table Association ("for the best thesis written by a woman, on a scientific subject, embodying new observations and new conclusions based on an independent laboratory research in biological, chemical, or physical science") are open to workers in psychology. Applications for the exact conditions should be made to Mrs. C. L. Franklin, chairman of the Sarah Berliner committee, 527 Cathedral Parkway, New York, or to Dr. Jane Welch, Baltimore, Maryland, of the Naples Table Association.

PRESIDENT TAFT, upon recommendation of the secretary of the interior, has forwarded to the senate the nomination of Professor Philander P. Claxton, professor of education in the University of Tennessee, as commissioner of education to succeed Dr. Elmer E. Brown, who recently resigned to accept the chancellorship of New York University.

FRANK A. MANNY, of the education and extension departments of the Western State Normal School, Kalamazoo, Mich., has been appointed director of the training of teachers in the city of Baltimore.

PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE has received the honorary degrees of doctor of letters from Harvard University and of doctor of laws from Yale University.

DR. KNIGHT DUNLAP, associate in psychology at the Johns Hopkins University, has been appointed associate professor.

DR. EDWARD L. SCHAUB, of Cornell University, has been appointed assistant professor of philosophy at the Queens University, Kingston, Canada.

PROFESSOR M. A. CALDWELL, of Ursinus College, has been appointed professor of philosophy at the University of Louisville.

MR. ARTHUR U. POPE, of Brown University, has been appointed assistant professor of philosophy at the University of California.

PROFESSOR ERNST MEUMANN, of the University of Leipzig, has been called to the Kolonialinstitut in Hamburg.